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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today on the privacy of passport records. My name is Marc Rotenberg and I am 
Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. EPIC is a public interest 
research organization in Washington, DC. We have a particular interest in the 
enforcement of the federal Privacy Act and the protection of privacy by federal agencies 
that collect personal information. We appreciate the work of the Judiciary Committee on 
these issue and the legislative proposals that have been introduced to help safeguard the 
privacy rights of Americans. 
As recent news stories and the Inspector General’s report make clear, the personal 
information in the passport files of Americans is not adequately protected.1 More 
alarming is that the reports of poor privacy controls at the State Department comes at a 
time when federal agencies are turning over their responsibilities to private contractors 
and the Administration is pushing to extend data collection and dissemination across the 
federal government.  
It is not simply the passport information of Presidential candidates or celebrities 
that is at risk; it is the privacy of any person who obtains a state drivers license, works in 
the federal government, travels across the border to Canada, or seeks employment.  
The experience of the passport breaches and the increased information collection 
efforts at agencies show that new privacy protections are necessary to safeguard the 
rights of the American public. The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 495, which 
has already passed this Committee, would help address the problem. EPIC also 
recommends limiting employee and contractor disclosures; increasing accounting 
                                                
1 See EPIC, Passport Privacy, http://epic.org/privacy/travel/pass/. 
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requirements; and the creation of an independent privacy agency. Further, the State 
department should be more open about its information security practices.  
 
I. Breaches in the Passport Record System Show That the State Department 
and Private Contractors Inadequately Protect Personal Information.  
 
Personal information of American citizens in their passport files is inadequately 
protected.  This conclusion is confirmed by the Inspector General.  The State Department 
grants contractors access to citizen's personal information under multimillion dollar 
contracts, and these contractors have been implicated in these breaches. 
The problem of improper access to passport records stretches back at least as far 
as the 1992 Presidential campaign. Three U.S. State Department officials conducted a 
search of Presidential candidate William Clinton’s passport file during that presidential 
election. In October 1992, the F.B.I. investigated whether Clinton’s passport file was 
accessed illegally after it was discovered that several pages of his passport file were 
missing.2 The State Department concluded that Clinton’s file was accessed purposefully 
to influence the outcome of the presidential election.3  The investigation led to the 
resignation of one State Department official and the dismissal of the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Consular Affairs.  
It is because of the 1992 episode that alarm bells literally went off when there was 
improper access to the passport files of the Presidential canidates earlier this year. In 
March of 2008, the State Department announced that on three different dates Senator 
                                                
2 David Johnston, F.B.I. Investigating Possible Gaps in File On Clinton Passport, NEW YORK 
TIMES, October 7, 1992, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3DC1531F934A35753C1A964958260. 
3 Robert Pear, State Dept. Official Who Searched Clinton's Passport Files Resigns, NEW YORK 
TIMES, November 18, 1992, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE5D71F39F93BA25752C1A964958260. 
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Obama’s passport records were accessed by three different contract employees who had 
no legitimate reason to access the records.4 Two of the employees were terminated, while 
the third was disciplined.5 Spokesman Sean McCormack stated that the State Department 
requires all government and contract employees who log onto the system to access 
passport records to acknowledge “that the records are protected by the Privacy act and 
that they are only available on a need-to-know basis”.6 Sen. Obama’s passport file breach 
was detected by a monitoring system.7 The monitoring system is “tripped” when an 
employee accesses the record of a high-profile individual.8 Later, the State Department 
revealed that Senator Clinton and Senator McCain’s files had also been improperly 
accessed. 
All three Presidential candidates expressed their concern about the privacy of 
passport records. Senator Barack Obama said that the breaches were “deeply disturbing” 
and while he appreciated Condoleeza Rice’s apology, he said he expected a “full and 
thorough investigation”. He further said, “One of the things that the American people 
count on in their interactions with any level of government is that if they have to disclose 
personal information, that it stay personal and stay private."9  
Senator Hillary Clinton’s office released a statement saying that “Senator Clinton 
will closely monitor the State Department's investigation into this and the other breaches 
                                                
4 Teleconference with Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management and Sean 
McCormack, U.S. Department of State, Spokesman (March 20, 2008), 
http://www.state.gov/m/rls/102460.htm. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Obama urges inquiry into passport snooping” (March 21, 2008), 
http://us.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/21/obama.passport/index.html#cnnSTCVideo 
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of private passport information.”10 Senator John McCain said that “If anyone’s privacy 
was is breached, then they deserve an apology and a full investigation. I believe that will 
take place. . . . The United States of America values everyone’s privacy and corrective 
action should be taken.”11  His office also released a statement: “The U.S. government 
has a responsibility to respect the privacy of all Americans. It appears that privacy was 
breached and I expect a thorough review and a change in procedures as necessary to 
ensure the privacy of all passport files.”12 
 
The Inspector General’s July 2008 Report. 
 
Subsequent to these events, the Inspector General undertook an investigation of 
improper access to passport files at the State Department.  Although the report is heavily 
redacted, the Inspector General found that 127 politicians, athletes and entertainers’ 
records had been excessively accessed between September 2002 and March 2008.13 The 
IG’s report founds numerous problems in the system used to protect confidentiality of 
passport records and made 22 recommendations to improve it.14  The report further noted 
a general lack of policies, procedures, guidance, and training regarding the prevention 
                                                
10 Statement on Breach of Senator Clinton's Passport File, (March 21, 2008), 
http://www.clinton.senate.gov/news/statements/details.cfm?id=295036&&. 
11  CNN Video (March 21, 2008), 
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/politics/2008/03/21/america.votes.friday.cnn?iref=videosearc
h 
12 Helene Coooper, State Department Investigating Breach of Candidates' Passport Files, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/state-dept-
punishes-aides-for-obama-passport-breach/. 
13 United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of 
Inspector General, Review of Controls and Notification for Access to Passport Records in the 
Department of State's Passport Information Electronic Records Systems (PIERS), Appendix A, 
AUD/IP-08-29 (July, 2008), available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/070308n2.pdf 
[hereinafter, OIG Report]. 
14 Id. at 4. 
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and detection of unauthorized access to passport and applicant information.15 Also, the 
subsequent response and disciplinary processes taken in response to breaches was found 
to be inadequate.16  
II. The Use of Private Contractors at the State Department Contributed to 
the Privacy Problem. 
 
Part of the problem at the State Department, which is also a problem at other 
federal agencies, is that the agency turns over its record management responsibilities to 
private contractors who feel little obligation to protect the privacy interests of Americans. 
The Department of State hires contract staff to assist with processing passport 
applications.17 Contractors assist “government employees by answering customer service 
enquiries, printing and mailing issued passports, and entering data.”18 Contractors 
comprised between 40-45% of the total employees at passport agencies and centers since 
2001.19 An estimated 800 of the 2,635 contractors currently work in the National Passport 
Information Center.  Those 800 contractors assist with current applications and are not 
granted access to the PIERS. 20  In addition, third parties identified as routine users are 
“allowed access to PIERS based upon agreements with those agencies as to how they will 
use this data and protect it within the Privacy Act.”21 
The contract employees who gained unauthorized access to the passport files of 
Senator Obama, Senator Clinton, and Senator McCain were employed by Stanley, Inc. 
                                                
15Id. at 1-4; See also id. at 39-42. 
16Id. at 1-4. 
17 Office of the Department of State Spokesman, “Questions Taken at the March 24, 2008 Daily 
Press Briefing”, March 24, 2008, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/mar/102569.htm.   
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
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and The Analysis Corporation.22 On March 17, 2008, just days before the public learned 
of the breaches if passport records, the State Department awarded Stanley, Inc. a five-
year $570 million contract to continue to oversee the printing, quality control, and 
mailing of U.S. passports and other travel documents.23  
 
III. Increasing Identification Requirements and Information “Sharing”  
Initiatives Exacerbate Poor Privacy Protections. 
 
Recent news of poor privacy controls at the State Department comes at a time 
when Americans are being asked to provide more and more personal information to 
federal agencies.  Security breaches, such as access to passport records at the State 
Department, are alarming in isolation. However they are much more significant given 
recent trends to increase identification mandates and information collection and 
dissemination. 
 
The National Strategy for Information Sharing Increases Privacy Risks. 
 
Over the last several years, the Administration has pursued an aggressive plan for 
information collection and dissemination across the federal government, but with little 
regard for privacy protection. In October 2007, the President released the “National 
Strategy for Information Sharing.”24  The strategy describes information “sharing” 
between state and local governments, the private sector, and foreign countries. The 
strategy encourages information sharing related to broad and undefined categories 
                                                
22U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing (March 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/mar/102485.htm. 
23 Stanley, Inc. Home Page, “Stanley Awarded $570 Million Contract to Continue Support of 
Passport Program”, http://investor.stanleyassociates.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=198762&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1119161 
24 The White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing, October, 2007, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/NSIS_book.pdf. 
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including “terrorism, homeland security or law enforcement information related to 
terrorism.”25  Participation in this program is not conditioned on successful 
implementation of privacy principles. The strategy refers to recently implemented or 
expanded federal programs that collect citizens’ personal information, including the 
“Information Sharing Environment,” fusion centers, a “terrorist screening center,” and 
the “Homeland Security Information Network.”26   
Privacy protections are lacking from this strategy. The strategy declares that 
information needs of state and local entities will grow as they incorporate homeland 
security into their day-to-day crime fighting activities.27  Fusion centers are the "primary 
focal points" for sharing of terrorism related information.28 Private sector information 
sharing focuses on sharing with operators and owners of "critical infrastructure."29 In 
receiving foreign information the "guiding objective" is to ensure that the US can 
disseminate the information "as broadly as possible."30 Meanwhile, privacy is to be 
protected by a "Privacy Guidelines Committee" chaired by the Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence.31  The committee will consist of the privacy officers of 
the departments and agencies of the Information Sharing Council.32 
Basic security and fairness considerations require that increased personal data 
collection must be balanced by strong privacy safeguards. As the federal government 
collects and shares more personal data, it increases the risk that Americans’ privacy will 
                                                
25 Id. at 27. 
26 Id. at 7-8, 
27 Id. at 17. 
28 Id. at 20. 
29 Id. at 21. 
30 Id. at 25. 
31 Id. at 28. 
32 Id.  
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be breached by snoops, identity thieves, or others. Greater collection also increases the 
damage that results from privacy violations. Breaches involving large amounts of 
personal information are generally greater threats than those concerning smaller amounts 
of data. Recent federal surveillance efforts have increased the likelihood that an 
American will become a victim of a privacy breach, and heightened the risks associated 
with a breach. These measures have not been accompanied by stronger privacy 
protections. 
 
Increasing Requirements for Americans to Use Passports and Other Identification 
Documents Exacerbate Poor Privacy Protections.  
 
Increasing requirements for individuals to use identification systems should be 
matched by increasing privacy safeguards for these systems. The Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act required the Department of Homeland Security to enact 
requirements for a passport or other document denoting citizenship for all travel into the 
United States by American citizens.33 Homeland Security subsequently created the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.34 Air travelers were required to present a passport 
or secure travel documents beginning on January 23, 2007.35 Land and Sea entry 
requirements will be fully implemented by June 2009.36 These requirements have led to 
                                                
33 Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7209(b), 108 Stat. 3637, 3823 
34 Department of Homeland Security, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1200693579776.shtm. 
35 Department of Homeland Security, Documents Required for Travelers Departing From or 
Arriving in the United States at Air Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western Hemisphere, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 68411 ( Nov. 24, 2006) ( to be codified at 8 CFR Parts 212 and 235; 22 CFR Parts 41 and 
53). 
36 Department of Homeland Security, Documents Required for Travelers Departing From or 
Arriving in the United States at Sea and Land Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western 
Hemisphere, 73 Fed. Reg. 18383 (April 3, 2008) (to be codified at 8 CFR Parts 212 and 235; 22 
CFR Parts 41 and 53). 
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an increase in the demand for passports37 and should be matched by an increase in 
passport privacy. 
The REAL ID Act increases the requirement for driver's licenses and indirectly 
increases the demand for the use of passports. The REAL ID Act sets minimum standards 
for driver's licenses for federal purposes.38 A passport can be used to meet one of these 
standards for getting a driver's license. 39 Further, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff has 
advised that a passport will serve the same federal purposes as a REAL ID compliant 
driver's license.40 These increased identification requirements should be matched by 
increased privacy protections. 
 
IV. Strong Privacy Protections are Needed to Reduce Privacy Risks. 
The experience of the passport breaches and the increased information collection 
efforts at agencies show that several new privacy protections are necessary.  The use of 
contractors and permissive disclosures threaten privacy, and these should be curtailed.  
Stronger accounting within agencies will help to detect and investigate breaches. These 
recommendations improve on the ones made by the Inspector General. Further, the 
creation of an independent privacy authority will improve privacy protections. 
 
The Federal Privacy Act Is Undermined by The Use of Contractors. 
 
                                                
37 Molly Hennesy-Fiske, Federal Officials Admit They Weren't Ready for High Passport Demand, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 20, 2007, available at http://travel.latimes.com/articles/la-trw-
passports20jun20. 
38  Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
39 Department of Homeland Security; Minimum Standards for Drivers Licenses and Identification 
Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes: Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 5271, 
5333 § 37.11(c)(1)(i) (Jan 29, 2008).  
40 Department of Homeland Security, Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff 
at a Press Conference on REAL ID,  (Jan 11, 2008), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1200320940276.shtm.  
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A specific purpose of the Privacy Act is that data collectors should provide 
adequate safeguards for personal information that they have collected. When Congress 
enacted the Privacy Act in 1974, it declared that: 
 
The Purpose of this act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against 
an invasion of personal privacy by requiring Federal Agencies, except as 
otherwise provided by law, . . .  (4) to collect, maintain, use or disseminate any 
record of identifiable personal information in a manner that assures that such 
action is for a necessary and lawful purpose, that the information is current and 
accurate for its intended use, and that adequate safeguards are provided to 
prevent misuse of such information.41 
 
In line with this purpose, agencies are required to: 
 
establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to insure 
the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against any anticipated 
threats or hazards to their security or integrity which could result in substantial 
harm,  embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on whom 
information is maintained.42 
 
These mandates are undermined when agencies allow contractors to operate and access 
systems of records. The Privacy Act requires the agency to cause a contractor to follow 
the  obligations of the Privacy Act.43 The Privacy Act requirements apply "when an 
agency provides by a contract for the operation by or on behalf of the agency of a system 
of records to accomplish an agency function."44 For the purposes of the criminal liability 
provisions, employees of the contractor are considered to be agency employees.45 
Contractors are less accountable to agency oversight. The OIG recommended 
determining the feasibility of guidelines to discipline those engaged in unauthorized 
                                                
41 Pub. L. No. 93-579,  § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). 
42 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(10). 
43 5 U.S.C. § 552a (m). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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access, including contractors and outside agencies.46  Bureaus within the department 
disagreed, stating that they had no jurisdiction to engage in disciplinary action against 
outside agencies and contractors.47  
 
Broad disclosures Within Agencies and to Contractors Undermine Privacy Act Purposes. 
 
 Limiting agency disclosures will limit the risk of unauthorized access and other 
data breaches. Routine use and other disclosure rules allow broad access by contractors 
and agency employees. The Privacy Act permits disclosures to be made according to 
"routine uses."48 The only requirements are that the disclosure of the record be "for a 
purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected"49 and that a 
description of the disclosure be published in the Federal Register.50 For its passport 
system, the State Department permits routine use disclosures of passport information to 
"contractor personnel conducting data entry, scanning, corrections and modifications."51 
This effectively gives contractors access to read and edit personal information in the 
passport system of records. 
 The Government Accountability Office has recently reported on how broad 
disclosures, including "routine use" definitions by agencies may undermine the Privacy 
Act's goals to limit uses to specified purposes.52 The report notes: 
 
                                                
46 OIG Report, supra note 13, at 30. 
47 OIG Report, supra note 13, at 30-31. 
48 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(3). 
49 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(7). 
50 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(4)(D). 
51 Department of State; Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 73 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1662 
(January 9, 2008).  
52 Government Accountability Office, Privacy: Alternatives Exist for Enhancing Protection of 
Personally Identifiable Information, GAO-08-536 (May 2008). 
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According to generally accepted privacy principles of purpose specification, 
collection limitation and use limitation principles, the collection of personal 
information should be limited and its use should be limited to a specified purpose. 
Yet current laws and guidance impose only modest requirements for describing 
the purposes for collecting and using personal information, and limiting how that 
information is collected and used.53 
 
 The Privacy Act permits wide disclosure of records within Agencies. Disclosure 
is permitted "to those officers and employees of the agency . . . who have a need for the 
record in the performance of their duties."54 The GAO calls these only "modest limits" on 
the use of information for multiple purposes within an agency.55  Wide disclosures within 
agencies undermine privacy protections by making unauthorized disclosures more likely.  
For example, State Department officials described trainees as having access to production 
data, rather than a dummy training records.56 Officials also described that trainees are 
recommended to look up their relatives during training -- it was during one of these 
lookups that a trainee viewed Hillary Clinton's information.57 These are unnecessary 
disclosures of information, which go beyond the purpose for which passport records are 
collected. 
 EPIC recommends that these disclosures be limited to those that are "for the 
purposes for which the data was collected." Such a limit would prevent trainee uses of 
data. More importantly, limiting disclosure limits the risk of a data breach and 
unauthorized disclosures because it limits the potential sources of breaches.  For example, 
the Federal Communications Commission recently tightened the rules under which 
                                                
53 Id. at 5. 
54 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(1). 
55 Government Accountability Office, Privacy: Alternatives Exist for Enhancing Protection of 
Personally Identifiable Information, GAO-08-536, 39 (May, 2008). 
56 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing (March 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/mar/102485.htm. 
57 Id. 
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telecommunications companies could share customer records with joint venture and 
independent contractors.58 The FCC specifically noted that the risk of breaches increases 
when new parties gain access to personal information.59 Once there has been a disclosure 
of data, the collector "no longer has control over it and thus the potential for loss of this 
data is heightened."60  
Stronger Accounting Helps to Detect, Prosecute Unauthorized Access. 
 
Congress should require accounting for all record access.  Audit trails help to 
investigate breaches as well as serve as the raw data that can proactively detect misuse. 
While investigating the passport database, the OIG found "many control weaknesses -- 
including a general lack of policies, procedures, guidance and training -- relating to the 
prevention and detection of unauthorized access to passport and applicant information 
…."61  More robust accounting requirements could have prevented and detected the 
breaches in the passport records. 
The Privacy Act requires that accounting be made which includes the "date nature 
and purpose of each disclosure" and the "name and address of the person or agency to 
whom the disclosure is made."62 Excepted from this accounting are disclosures made 
under § 552a(b)(1) --  "to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains the 
records who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties."63  This 
                                                
58  In the Matter of Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Telecommunications 
Carrier's Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Information; IP-Enabled 
Services, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-115, 
WC Docket No. 04-36, 22 (March 13, 2007) available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-22A1.pdf. 
59 Id. at 25. 
60 Id. at 23. 
61 OIG Report, supra note 13, at 1. 
62 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c)(1). 
63 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c)(1) (excepting disclosures made under § 552a (b)(1)). 
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significant gap in accounting means that misuse goes undetected, and breaches are 
difficult to investigate.  The OIG found that while the passport system logged user access, 
it did not log what activities were conducted or why the system was being accessed.64 
Further, the OIG found that this data is accessed via a Consular Consolidated Database 
web portal by other agencies.65 The report did not indicate whether this access was 
appropriately accounted.  
EPIC recommends that robust accounting requirements be applied to intra-agency 
disclosures. The exception for (b)(1) disclosures in § 552a(c)(1) should be removed.  
 
OIG Recommendations Are Insufficient to Protect Privacy. 
The OIG's recommendations do not go far enough to protect personal privacy, 
neither in the State Department nor throughout the federal government. Clear mandates 
are necessary, and limits on disclosure and tougher accounting will protect privacy better 
than more detailed information sharing agreements. 
  The OIG  review focused on the unauthorized access of passport data and the 
response to incidents of unauthorized access.66  After redactions, 6 of 22 
recommendations made by OIG remained accessible to varying degrees.67 In the 6 visible 
recommendations, the OIG  made recommendations that the CA “consider,” “determine 
the feasibility of,” and “evaluate”68 potential programs and policy amendments without 
specifics or mandates. Clear agency mandates which are effectively implemented are 
needed to protect privacy beyond these recommendations. 
                                                
64 OIG report, supra note 13, at 32. 
65 Id. at 33. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 40-42. 
68 Id. 
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Other recommendations include items such as evaluating the accuracy of Privacy 
Impact Assessments;69 conducting vulnerability and risk assessments;70 addressing third 
party disclosure and breaches;71 and altering the agreements with agencies and entities 
that access PIERS data.72 These recommendations have not yet been implemented. They 
do not address the root cause of the privacy problem -- that too many individuals have 
access to data and that insufficient systems detect improper access. 
Further, these recommendations only affect the Department of State.  Changes in 
federal law would broadcast these changes throughout the federal government. 
 
Creation of an Independent Privacy Authority Will Improve Privacy Protections. 
 
Improved privacy protection will be achieved by the creation of an independent 
privacy agency. Such an entity would have the authority and the expertise to ensure that 
agencies are complying with the Privacy Act and to help agencies anticipate new 
challenges involving rapidly changing technology and privacy issues. The organization 
should be independent of the executive branch. The correct model would be an 
independent agency, similar to the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal 
Communications Commission. 
In 1973 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare established a special 
panel to study privacy issues arising from the growing use of automated date processing 
equipment.73 That report led to the development and passage of the Privacy Act of 
                                                
69 Id. at 33. 
70 Id. at 34. 
71 Id. at 37. 
72 Id. at 36-7. 
73 US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights of 
Citizens, (July 1973), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm. 
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1974.74 But that report also made clear that the cornerstone of an effective federal policy 
is a permanent privacy agency.75 
In countries across the world, efforts are underway to address these privacy 
concerns. The European Union has implemented extensive privacy directives that 
establish legal rights for all citizens in the European Union countries.76 Non-EU 
countries, from Canada77 to Hong Kong,78 are pursuing comprehensive privacy agendas 
led by privacy agencies. These government agencies routinely report on the handling of 
privacy complaints,79 the emergence of new privacy issues, and proposed measures to 
protect privacy. These reports help the public and the government understand the status 
of privacy protection in their country and develop new approaches to replace old ones.  
But there is still no privacy agency in the United States. In many respects, this is 
surprising. It is clear that the absence of a privacy agency in the federal government 
remains a critical problem. Having announced numerous programs that hinge on the 
collection and dissemination of Americans’ personal information, some institutional 
balance must be established to ensure that these proposals receive adequate review. This 
would be a small investment in what many Americans consider their number one concern 
about our nation’s infrastructure – the protection of personal privacy. 
 
The State Department Should be More Open About Its Information Security Practices. 
 
                                                
74 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974). 
75 HEW Report, supra note 73, at § 3. 
76 European Commission, Data Protection – European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm. 
77 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Mandate and Mission of the OPC, 
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/aboutUs/index_e.asp. 
78 Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, Hong Kong, Homepage, 
http://www.pcpd.org.hk/. 
79 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, http://www.privcom.gc.ca/i_i/index_e.asp. 
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The OIG should remove the redactions in its report due to substantial interest that 
citizens have in the security of their passport information. Several recommendations in 
the report are redacted under FOIA exemption 2. Exemption 2 allows agencies to 
withhold information that is "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of 
an agency."80 The recommendations the OIG has made relate also to security of the 
personal information in passport records, not "solely for internal personnel rules and 
practices of an agency." The purpose of Exemption 2 is to "relieve agencies from the 
burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matter in which the public 
could not reasonably be expected to have an interest."81 Exemption 2 can be overcome if 
the documents in question relate to "substantial matters which might be the subject of 
legitimate public interest".82  
The relevant Exemption 2 test for this report is the “High 2,” examining whether 
the disclosure risks circumvention of agency regulations and statutes.  This standard was 
established in Founding Church of Scientology of Wash. v. Smith, where the court held, 
“[i]f withholding frustrates legitimate public interest, however, the material should be 
released unless the government can show that disclosure would risk circumvention of 
lawful agency regulation.”83 In Crooker  v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, the 
court held “[t]here can be little doubt that citizens have an interest in the manner in which 
they may be observed by federal agents.”84 In the case of electronic passport records, the 
files can be accessed not only by government employees, but also private contractors.85 
                                                
80 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2). 
81 Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-370 (1976). 
82 Id. at 365. 
83 Founding Church of Scientology of Wash. v. Smith, 721 F.2d 828, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
84 Crooker  v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 635 F.2d 887, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
85 OIG Report, supra note 13, at 1. 
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The Inspector General's report on the breaches of State Department passport files 
qualifies as the subject of a legitimate public interest, yet most of the "Results" sections 
of the IG's report was withheld under Exemption 2.  This section is highly relevant to the 
public because it details exactly what kinds of breaches were discovered and how 
prevalent these breaches are.  This information is similar to the information in Dep't of 
Air Force v. Rose.  In Rose, the Supreme Court considered whether Exemption 2 applied 
to case summaries of hearings concerning violations of the Air Force Academy's Honor 
and Ethics code.86  The Court ruled that, although the summaries clearly related to 
internal personnel matters, the public's interest in the integrity of its armed forces 
removed this information from the category of matters of internal significance.87  In the 
case of passport records, the public's interest in the security of personal information and 
State Department compliance with the Privacy Act, is certainly as important.  
The PIERS database contains records on 192 million passport files of 127 million 
passport holders,88 and because these records can be viewed without automatic internal 
agency notification, the potential security breaches constitute a legitimate privacy and 
security concern for the public. According to the executive summary of the report, the 
passport records contain personally identifiable information, including the applicant's 
name, gender, social security number, date and place of birth, and vital records.89 
Unauthorized access to this information creates a high risk for the public, and the report 
describes a multitude “weaknesses and data vulnerabilities” in the PIERS system.90   
                                                
86 Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). 
87 Id. 
88 OIG Report, supra note 13, at 1. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 33. 
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It is our recommendation that the Inspector General release a more complete 
report, with, at a minimum, the titles of each of the individual recommendations so that 
the public can adequately gauge their effectiveness in protecting privacy. 
 
V. Need for Comprehensive Privacy Legislation. 
The problems with passport records are not unique to the State Department. 
Across the federal government, there are growing risks to personal privacy. Technology 
has marched and left the law behind. But the protection of privacy remains a central 
concern for Americans as it was for the Presidential candidates who learned that their 
personal information, which they were required to provide to the federal government, had 
been improperly accessed by private contractors. 
 It is for this reason that EPIC strongly supports passage of S. 495, the Personal 
Data Privacy and Security Act. This Act would effectively handle this problem by putting 
in place high standards for business entities that deal with sensitive personally 
identifiable information. These standards and practices would assist in prevention and 
disciplinary action in situations like the passport information breach. One of the most 
relevant provisions requires that the entity “adopt measures that… detect actual and 
attempted… unauthorized access… of sensitive personally identifiable information, 
including by employees and other individuals otherwise authorized to have access.”91 
This provision and the institution of the program as a whole directly provide for 
prevention and detection that did not exist at the State Department at the time of the 
passport breaches. 
                                                
91 S. 495, 110th Cong. § 302(4)(B)(ii). 
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 Disciplinary action, the other issue brought up by the OIG, is provided for in  § 
303, Enforcement, which provides for penalties for offending entities. Although the bill 
does not address disciplinary actions against specific employees, it allows for penalties of 
up to $1 million per intentional violation.92 This provides incentives to these 
organizations to prevent violations and enact disciplinary measures against employees 
who put the entities in danger of liability.  
 The bill also addresses contractor relationships, one of the major issues in the 
passport breaches. Under the provisions in § 401, the data privacy and security programs 
of potential contractors, as well as any history of breaches and their response to such 
breaches, would be evaluated by the government before any contracts would be awarded. 
Additionally, § 402 provides for evaluation and auditing of contractors already affiliated 
with government agencies. These provisions would ensure that government agencies, 
which often retain some of the most sensitive personally identifiable information about 
US persons, would only contract with and allow access to this information to entities that 
have proven their commitment to the high standards required by the other portions of the 
Act. 
 Finally, § 331 of the bill provides for the creation of a new office in the Federal 
Trade Commission called the Office of Federal Identity Protection. This office would 
assist consumers in prevention of identity theft and personal privacy information 
violation as well as providing assistance after a violation has occurred. Requiring the 
FTC to “help consumers restore their stolen or otherwise compromised personally 
identifiable information quickly and inexpensively,”93 not only serves those betrayed by 
                                                
92 Id. at § 303(a). 
93 Id. at § 331(c)(9) 
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entities who have failed to meet the requirements of the Act, but also provides incentive 
to the FTC to see to the strict enforcement of the Act thus minimizing the cost of 
operating the Office of Federal Identity Protection. 
We understand that the Committee has already reported this bill favorably. We 
hope the full Senate will move quickly on S. 495 so that it can become law this year. 
Further delay, particularly in light of the recent problems at the State Department and 
other similar incidents, leaves the privacy of all Americans at risk. 
 
VI. Conclusion. 
 
Recent news of poor privacy controls at the State Department comes at a time 
when Americans are being asked to provide more of their personal information to federal 
agencies and to produce more identification documents. The experience of the passport 
breaches and the increased information collection efforts make clear that new privacy 
protections are necessary. EPIC recommends limiting employee and contractor 
disclosures; increasing accounting requirements; and the creation of an independent 
privacy agency. Further, the State Department should be more open about its information 
security practices. Finally, EPIC supports passage of S. 495, the Personal Data Privacy 
and Security Act. 
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Judiciary Committee 
today. I will be pleased to answer your questions. 
